Communication in multilateral bargaining by Agranov, Marina & Tergiman, Chloe
ONLINE APPENDIX
Instructions for the Chat Treatment
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple, and if
you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT
OF MONEY which will be PAID TO YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment. The currency
in this experiment is called tokens. All payoffs are denominated in this currency. The total
amount of tokens you earn in the experiment will be converted into US dollars using the rate
50 Tokens = $1. In addition, you will get a $5 participation fee if you complete the experiment.
In this experiment you will act as voters. You will distribute funds between yourself and
others in a series of Periods. In each Period you will be randomly divided into groups of 5
members each. Each group will decide how to split a sum of money. Proposals will be voted up
or down (accepted or rejected) by majority rule. That is, once 3 out 5 voters approve a proposal,
it passes. In any Period you will not know the identity of the subjects you are matched with
and your group-members will not know your identity. In each Period you will have to decide
how to divide 250 tokens among the 5 voters in your group. One of the 5 voters in your group
will be randomly chosen to make a proposal of how to split 250 tokens among the 5 voters
(provisional budget proposal). Each voter has the same chance of being selected to make a
proposal. Allocations to each member must be between 0 and 250 tokens. All allocations must
add up to 250 tokens. After the selected proposer has made his/her allocation, this proposal
will be posted on your computer screens with the proposed allocation to you and the other
voters clearly indicated. You will then have to decide whether to accept or reject the proposed
allocation.
If the proposal passes (gets 3 or more votes), the proposed allocation is implemented and we
will move on to the next Period. If the proposal is defeated (gets less than 3 votes), there will
be a call for new proposals and the process will repeat itself. However, the amount of money to
be divided will be reduced by 20% of the amount of money in the preceding Round and rounded
to the nearest integer. Thus, if the proposal in Round 1 is rejected, the new proposal in Round
2 will involve splitting 200 tokens among the 5 voters. And if this new proposal is rejected in
Round 2, then in round 3 you will be splitting 160 tokens. If the proposal in rejected in Round
3, then in Round 4 you will be splitting 128 tokens, etc This process will repeat itself until a
proposed allocation is passed (gets 3 or more votes).
To summarize, the steps of the process will work as follows:
1. One voter is randomly selected to make a proposal of how to split 250 tokens.
2. A vote is held (each member of the group votes to accept or reject the proposal of selected
voter).
3. If 3 or more out of 5 voters accept it, then the proposal passes and the Period is over. If
the proposal is rejected, then the money shrinks by 20%, we move on to the next Round
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of this Period and a new voter is chosen to propose the split (each of the 5 voters in a
group has equal chance of being chosen). The process repeats itself until a proposal of
selected voter passes.
In each Period, you will be randomly re-matched into groups of 5 voters each. Each member
of the group is assigned an ID number (from 1 to 5), which is displayed on the top of the screen.
Once the Period is over, you will be randomly re-matched to form new groups of 5 voters each
and you will be assigned a (potentially) NEW ID. Please make sure you know your ID number
when making your decisions. Since ID numbers will be randomly assigned prior to the start of
each Period, all voters are likely to have their ID numbers vary between Periods, and, thus, it
is impossible to identify subjects using their ID numbers.
In each round, after one voter is selected to propose a split but before he/she submits his/her
proposal, members of a group will have the opportunity to communicate with each other using
the chat box. The communication is structured as follows. On the top of the screen, each
member of the group will be told her ID number. You will also know the ID number of the
voter who is currently selected to make a proposal. Below you will see a box, in which you will
see all messages sent to either all members of your group or to you personally. You will not see
the chat messages that are sent privately to other members. In the box below that one, you
can type your own message and send it either to the entire group or to particular members of
the group. To select subjects that will receive your message, simply click on the buttons that
correspond to the ID numbers of the subjects who you want to receive this message and hit
SEND. You can send message to all members of your group by clicking SELECT ALL button.
The chat option will be available until the selected voter submits her proposal. At this
moment the chat option will be disabled.
Remember that in each Period subjects are randomly matched into groups and ID numbers
of the group-members are randomly assigned. Thus, your ID number is likely to vary from
Period to Period, and, therefore, it is impossible to identify your group-members using your ID
number.
At the conclusion of the experiment we will sum up all the tokens you earned in the exper-
iment and convert this amount into US dollars using the conversion rate 50 tokens = $1. In
addition, you will receive a $5 participation fee for completing the experiment.
You are not to reveal your (potential) earnings, nor are you to speak or communicate in any
other way with any other subject while the experiment is in progress. This is important to the
validity of the study and will be not tolerated.
We will now go slowly through one practice Period to familiarize you with the screen. After
the practice Period is over, we will start the experiment, in which you will play 15 Periods for
cash.
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Review. Let’s summarize the main points:
1. The experiment will consist of 15 Periods. There may be several Rounds in each Period.
2. Prior to each Period, you will be randomly divided into groups of 5 voters each. Each
subject in a group will be assigned an ID number.
3. At the start of each Period, one subject in your group will be randomly selected to propose
a split of 250 tokens between the five of you. Before he/she submits his/her proposal,
members of the group can use the chat box to communicate with each other. You may
send public messages that will be delivered to all members of your group as well private
messages that will be delivered to members that you specify explicitly.
4. Proposals to each voter must be greater than or equal to 0 tokens.
5. If a simple majority accepts the proposal (3 or more voters), the Period ends.
6. If a simple majority rejects the proposal then a potentially new voter will be randomly
selected to make a proposal in subsequent Round of a given Period.
7. The amount of money to be divided shrinks by 20% following each rejection of a proposal
in a given Period.
Are there any questions?
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Screenshots
Below are the screenshots that show the interface that the proposers and responders faced.
Our goal was to make the interface as neutral as possible so as to not influence the subjects.
Subjects chose who to send messages, there was no default as to the publicness or privateness
of messages.
Proposer
Figure 1: Proposer screenshot
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Non-Proposer
Figure 2: Non-proposer screenshot
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Proposer Power: Further Evidence
In Subsection 4.1 we showed that Proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources in
the Chat than in the Baseline treatment. Figure 1 established this result by looking at proposals
that passed with no delays in the last 5 bargaining sessions. Figures 3 and 4 below consider two
alternative categories of proposals and show that our conclusions follow through irrespective of
the category of proposals one focuses on.
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(a) Baseline: Histogram of Proposer shares in the
last five bargaining sessions.
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(b) Chat: Histogram of Proposer shares in the
last five bargaining sessions.
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(d) Dynamics of Proposer shares over the course
of the game.
Figure 3: Proposer Shares in the last 5 bargaining sessions (all passed proposals).
In Figure 3 we include all proposals that were put forward and supported by a majority of
votes. In order to compare the shares of the proposers between treatments we express them as
a fraction of the total budget to accommodate the fact that some of these proposals are passed
in the second bargaining stage following a reduction of the budget. In Figure 4 we look at all
proposals that were submitted in the first bargaining stage (irrespective of whether they were
accepted or rejected). Both Figures 3 and 4 show very little difference with Figure 1, which
shows that our results are robust to changes in the categorizations of proposals.
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(a) Baseline: Histogram of Proposer shares in the
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Figure 4: Proposer Shares in the last 5 bargaining sessions (all proposals in the first bargaining
stage).
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Marginal Effects
In order to further support the fact that not being part of the coalition in a period leads one to
lower his/her reservation price, we present in Figure 5, for each bargaining session, the marginal
effect on the probability of lowering one’s reservation price if one wasn’t part of the coalition in
the previous bargaining session.1
The marginal effect of not being in the previous bargaining session on the probability of
lowering one’s bid is significant at the 1% level with a magnitude of 21%. That is, not being in
the previous bargaining session’s coalition implies a 21% average decrease in the probability of
lowering one’s reservation price. Notice that this effect is significant not just on average but at
each period for all but three periods.
The specification for this regression is:
LoweredReservationPricei,t = 1[β0 + β1Ei,t−1 +
τ=15∑
τ=2
(γτDi,τ ) + αi + i,t ≥ 0] (1)
Here 1[.] is an indicator function for a right hand side greater than zero, the time dummy
variable Di,τ has the value 1 if the observation comes from bargaining session t = τ and Ei,t−1
is a dummy equal to one if subject i was excluded from the coalition in bargaining session t−1.
Finally, αi is a subject specific error term and i,t is the idiosyncratic error term.
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Figure 5: Marginal effect on the probability of lowering one’s reservation price if one wasn’t
part of the coalition in the previous bargaining session, with 95% confidence bounds.
1All regression results are available upon request.
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